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V.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it appears that the Court has recognized its
position as one of benevolent neutrality.58 Rather than a "heads in the
sand" attitude that some would infer from the separation doctrine, recog-
nition must be given to the obligation to promote freedom, even if that
promotion involves a form of affirmative action. However, such affirma-
tive action is limited by two considerations. First, the action may not
bestow beneficial treatment on any or all religions but rather must be
limited to the removal of barriers, governmentally implaced, which ob-
struct freedom of exercise. 59 This is not granting the religion, or the
person, a special status but merely returning him to the status he rightfully
possessed before his rights were abridged by government intervention.
Secondly, the barrier may not be removed if the state can show a compelling
interest which will, in fact, be thwarted by the removal. The road to free-
dom becomes more clearly defined when the "blinders" of platitude are
removed and obligations are realistically assumed.
Richard H. Zamboldi
CONGRESS VERSUS COURT: THE LEGISLATIVE ARSENAL
It has long been a favorite pastime among lawyers and citizens gen-
erally, to verbally attack the decisions and to criticize the powers of the
United States Supreme Court. Indeed, some of the Court's harshest critics
have come from its own membership. Thus, upon his retirement in 1875
Justice Miller is reputed to have remarked,"I can't make a silk purse out
of a sow's ear. I can't make (Justice) Clifford and (Justice) Swayne, who
are too old, resign, nor keep the Chief Justice from giving them cases to
write opinions in which their garrulity is often mixed with mischief."'
However, in view of the Court's enormous power in our present con-
stitutional system, all criticism of the nation's highest tribunal will remain
purely verbal unless one of its sister branches of government acts. His-
torically, action by Congress or the President which nakedly challenges the
58. Cf. Kauper, Schernpp And Sherbert: Studies In Neutrality And Accommoda-
tion in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3 (1963).
59. The idea was expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) :
This case is resolvable not in terms of what an individual can demand of
government, but solely in terms of what government may not do to an individual
in violation of his religious scruples.
1. Anderson, We Will Hear More On The Supreme Court, 15 TENN. L. REv. 112
at 114 (1938).
COMMENTS
1
Gross: Congress versus Court: The Legislative Arsenal
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Court has come only when one or both of these politically oriented depart-
ments of government felt that its vital interests or inherent powers were
threatened.
Since 1937 the Supreme Court has struck down several Congressional
enactments 2 and, more recently, in Gray v. Sanders3 and Wesberry v.
Sanders,4 the Court has struck a series of hammer blows at Congressional
power and the very foundation upon which that power rests, namely, the
power to control the manner in which its districts of representation are
apportioned.
Predictably, opposition in Congress has steadily mounted and has
resulted in two resolutions pointedly warning the Court that further
poaching in what Congress considers its private preserve could bring
about a power struggle, the like of which has not often been seen in
American history.5 In view of the present membership of the Court and
its philosophy as expressed in recent opinions, any retreat by the judicial
branch seems extremely unlikely. Congress, therefore, will in all proba-
bility have to opt between an ignominious admission of the Supreme Court's
right to supervise what was previously regarded as legislative internal
affairs or an extremely dangerous attempt to impose its will on judicial
determinations.
Should Congress choose the latter course a number of constitutional
weapons would be available to it. We shall, therefore, attempt to examine
some of these weapons, determine their effectiveness and their degree of
insulation from Court interference and review.
Basically in a frontal attack upon the Court, Congress has two alterna-
tives. It can attempt to change the decisions which it finds offensive or it
can attempt to supplant the men who have made those decisions. The
tactics may vary with the goal sought, and state experiences often provide
us with a view of the likelihood of success.
IMPEACHMENT AND REMOVAL
Few remedies for curbing the Supreme Court's power have so often
been suggested or so seldom used as impeachment, conviction and removal
of Court members whom Congress finds offensive. The reasons for the
impotency of this seemingly powerful weapon are apparent from a glance
at the constitution. First, two-thirds of the Senate must concur in the
removal of any federal judge6 and still more difficult only "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors" are the basis for removal. 7
2. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Reid v. Covert; Kinsella v.
Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) ; United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
3. 372 U.S. 371 (1963).
4. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
5. H.J. Res. 1132, S.J. Res. 185, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964).
6. U.S. CONSTr. art. I, § 3.
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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The first serious suggestion of impeachment as a means of Congres-
sional counter-attack in a battle with the Court came in the great political
upheaval of 1800. In that year the Jeffersonian Republicans gained ascend-
ency in the Congress and Presidency. Almost immediately Congress began
an attempt to dominate the judiciary in general and the Supreme Court in
particular.
This movement took on various facets, the most interesting of which
was a concerted effort to remove any federal judge who failed to follow
the Republican political line. For their first target the Congress chose the
extremely vulnerable District Judge John Pickering, a hopeless lunatic
prone to drunkenness and profanity on the bench. In the subsequent im-
peachment and trial the House and Senate deliberately disregarded all
attempts to make the proceedings before them legal, rather than political,
in nature.8 Pickering was simply accused of misbehavior in office (without
any attempt to reconcile this charge with the constitutional requirement of
high crimes and misdemeanors) and convicted by the Republican con-
trolled Senate by a straight party vote of 19 to 7.9
With -the benefit of hindsight, the historian Henry Adams was to
remark, "so-confused, contradictory and irregular were these proceedings
that Pickering's trial was never considered a sound precedent.""' However,
to the unfortunate Judge's contemporaries in the Congress the precedent
seemed sound enough to proceed with their plans to strike at the Justices
of the Supreme Court."
Even while Pickering's trial was underway, the House impeached
Justice Samuel Chase and prepared to strike at Chief Justice John Marshall
as soon as the Senate disposed of Chase. Fortunately for the Court,
moderate Republicans in the Senate refused to convict Chase on the vague
charges framed by the House, and plans to remove Marshall were
abandoned.'2
Throughout the Pickering and Chase trials were woven the themes
which have ever since clouded the effectiveness of impeachment and re-
moval as a Congressional weapon against the Supreme Court.
Jeffersonian Republicans argued during these trials that if the federal
courts chose to directly confront the power of Congress the people could
speak only by removing from office those judges who disagreed with the
majority view on the effect of constitutional provisions. 13 Thus Senator
Giles of Virginia always insisted that impeachment was nothing more than
a declaration by the people's representatives that a judge held dangerous
8. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 AM. HIST. REv. 485 (1949).
9. Id. at 505.
10. 2 Adams, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 156 (1890-1891).
11. 2 Haynes, THE SENATE OV THE UNITED STATES 851 (1938).
12. Id. at 852.
13. At least one state (California) appears to have adopted this point of view by
its removal of Judge James Hardy in 1862 for using profanity while off the bench
and suspected Southern sympathies. Yankwick, Impeachment of Civil Oficers Under
The Federal Constitution, 26 Gto. L.J. 849 (1938).
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opinions and must therefore give way to someone who could fill the office
better.14 Despite the failure of Congress to affect the Supreme Court's
membership by its impeachment efforts in 1803, Senator Giles' views have
been shared by responsible spokesmen throughout American history. In-
deed, in 1917, Senator Owen went so far as to propose a summary con-
viction and removal from office of any federal judge on any level who
declared a federal statute unconstitutional.'"
The Federalist position on impeachment quite simply called for a
literal interpretation of the constitutional provisions on the subject. Thus
before a federal judge could be removed he would have to commit an
indictable common law crime.16 Under this view, impeachment would, of
course, be virtually useless as a political weapon of the legislative branch.
Actually, history has chosen a middle ground between these two ex-
treme views on the subject. Seven federal judges have been impeached
since Pickering and Chase and three besides the former have been convicted
and removed. Of those convicted, the broadest charges were against Dis-
trict judge Ritter in 1936 (bringing his court into disrepute); and the
most specific, against Judge Archbald (treason and accepting an office in
the Confederacy).17 No Supreme Court Justice has been impeached since
Chase; thus, the exact point of how far Congress can go in using impeach-
ment as a political weapon is still unsettled. The most recent authority on
the subject is found in the unsuccessful attempt to remove Judge English.
The House committee on the matter reported the ingredients necessary as
including:
... acts which are not defined as criminal and made subject to indict-
ments and also . . . those which affect the public welfare . . . No
judge may be impeached for a wrong decision.1 8
Whether a Supreme Court judgment affecting the vital interests of Con-
gress is against "public welfare" or merely a "wrong decision" which must
be righted by less severe measures than impeachment is still an open
question. However, the latter view would seem to be more in accord with
the historic outlook on the problem. 19
Finally we come to the problem of whether the courts are empowered
to check Congress should it adopt the old Jeffersonian Republican view of
impeachment. Only once has a displaced judge challenged the validity of
his removal in the courts. In Ritter v. U. S., 20 the Court of Claims held
that sole jurisdiction in impeachment matters rests in Congress. The case
is important not only because it precludes jurisdiction but also because it
14. 3 JOHN QuINcy ADAMS' MEMOIRS 112 (Ford ed. 1874).
15. S.J. Res. 195, 64th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1917).
16. Several Republicans absented themselves rather than vote for conviction, Kelly
and Harbison, TIir AMERICAN CoNsTITuTION 232 (1955).
17. Haynes, supra note 11, at 860.
18. 3 NWilloughby, THE CONSTITUTION OV THE UNITED STATES 1450 (1929).
19. Simpson, Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 651 (1916).
20. 84 Ct. Cl. 293 (1936).
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appears to accept a rather extreme position on the political nature of
impeachment. It holds in part:
While the Senate in one sense acts as a court on the trial of an
impeachment, it is essentially a political body and in its actions is
influenced by the view of its members on the public welfare."1
The Ritter case would seem to over-emphasize the role of the Senate as a
political body in matters of conviction and removal. A better view would
be to regard the Senate as a court, but not necessarily one which had to
adhere strictly to the common law. This would allow the Senate some
freedom to remove Justices who disgrace the bench but do not commit an
actual crime. There is, of course, danger here that the Senate would
interpret "disgraceful conduct" too loosely, but there is no danger-free
course in this area.
Finally, regardless of which view the Senate adopts, the Ritter case's
refusal to disturb the Congressional finding is sound policy. Once the
Congress has spoken on such a matter, the courts have no constitutional
grounds for interference.
ALTERATION IN MEMBERSHIP
There are a number of ways in which Congress may strike at the
Court by affecting its membership. The most obvious of these lies in the
Congressional power over court appointments. Congress could, if it chose,
merely refuse to supply the two-thirds vote necessary in the Senate to
confirm new appointments to the Court.22 Thus as vacancies occurred
among members of the Court who were unfavorable to Congress, that body
could affect the Justices' voting pattern by holding down the number of
those participating.
Historically, the most successful example of such reverse court packing
came in 1865 and 1867 when Congress refused to fill the vacancies created
by the deaths of Justices Catron and Wayne who had been generally in
disagreement with the Radical Republican views on the nature of the post
Civil War Union.2 3 The effect of this action was to stall court decisions
on a number of serious questions 24 until a popular mandate swept U. S.
Grant into the presidency in 1867, thus cementing an alliance between the
executive and legislative branches which the Court proved unable to with-
stand. Reverse court packing can, therefore, prove extremely useful as a
short run solution when the Congress finds itself confronted with a hostile
21. Id. at 299. For a similar holding, with slightly different reasoning, on the state
level see Ferguson v. Maddox, 114 Tex. 85, 263 S.W. 888 (1924). However, the
latter case involved the removal of an executive rather than judicial officer.
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
23. Kelly and Harbison, supra note 16, at 478.
24. E.g., Miss. v. Johnson, 4 Wallace 475 (U.S. 1867); Georgia v. Stanton, 6
Wallace 50 (U.S. 1867). In both cases the court avoided the problem of the con-
stitutionality of the reconstruction by the rather lame excuse that the question
was political.
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Court and a neutral or unfriendly executive. Thus if the legislative arm of
government is confident that it represents the majority view in the country
it can stand firm against appointments to the Court and put its position to
the test in the next presidential election.
This is precisely what happened in 1868. Furthermore, Congress, once
it had a president in sympathy with its views, quickly increased the size of
Court membership from eight to nine.25
The idea of inflating the Court's membership has always been a favorite
of the other two branches. 26 Of course, the most famous instance was the
unsuccessful 1937 "court packing" of the 76th Congress which was dis-
guished as an attempt to retire over-aged federal judges. This plan pro-
posed, in effect, to increase the Court's size from nine to fifteen members. 27
Although President Roosevelt was obviously the prime instigator of the
plan, many commentators also viewed it as an attempt to strike at the
Court from the legislature. Thus the president of the Massachusetts Bar
Association stated that the plan would threaten:
. . . the liberties of the American people by so disrupting our con-
stitutional frame of government as to throw absolute power, tin-
checked by constitutional restraint, into the hands of Congress .... 28
INTERFERENCE WITH COURT ADMINISTRATION
In the middle of the last century the state legislature of Arkansas
attempted to impose a penalty of forfeiture of salary on any judge who
failed to administer his office in a proper manner. This action was im-
mediately tested and denounced in ringing terms by the state supreme
court in Ex Parte Tully2 9 which held in part that:
. . . if the Courts could be disgraced, and rendered imbecile by the
reduction of their salaries, or moulded to suit their wishes and designs,
then the judiciary would have no higher office or duties to perform
than simply to register the mandates and edicts of the Legislature.
How, then, could the judges declare the will of the legislature, or
rightly interpret the laws, so as to make their decrees and judgments
living monuments of truth and justice to their own age and bequeath
them, as a rich and invaluable legacy, to posterity, around which the
friends of liberty could rally .... 30
The Arkansas action suggests another line of attack Congress could take
to restrict judicial powers. Constitutionally Congress is prohibited from
lowering the salaries of federal judges during their tenure of office. 31 How-
25. 16 Stat. 44 (1869).
26. In 1868 the Radical Republicans went to great lengths to assure that the judges
appointed by President Grant subscribed to the Congressional view of Reconstruction.
Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal
Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REv. 977 (1941).
27. Draft Bill, 22 MAss. L.Q. 16 (1937).
28. Id. at 9.
29. 4 Ark. 220 (1842).
30. Id. at 223-24.
31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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ever, at the same time Congress is given authority over the appropriation
of federal monies and it has long assumed control over routine court ad-
ministration matters.3 2 By using the power of the purse over which it is
the undisputed master, Congress could greatly limit the powers of action
by the Supreme Court.
This method of attack was apparently tried on the state level in a
struggle between the legislature and executive of Missouri. There the
legislature refused to appropriate funds for an executive department with
which it had a policy disagreement. This attempt was ruled unconstitu-
tional in State v. Tolerton,8 3 which held that such an act effectively de-
prived the executive officials of their salaries. (which were guaranteed much
like those of federal judges). Therefore, should Congress attempt to strike
at the Court by cutting off its funds, an analogy to the Missouri case could
be used. The reasoning would, of course, be that Congress was actually
attempting to cut judicial salaries by denying appropriations to the Court.
However, it is well to remember two points regarding such an analogy.
First, Missouri's court was adjudicating as a neutral observer of a struggle
between two other branches of government. There is no guarantee that
another court, whose own power was challenged, could find the strength
to make a like decision. Second, were Congress to move in a circumspect
manner and merely gradually reduce Court appropriations while still pro-
viding for the justices' salaries, interference by the Court would be unlikely,
since no adequate remedy would be available to the Court. Furthermore,
if the cut in appropriations was carefully drawn, no issue for the Court to
strike at would be presented.
Besides the power over the purse, Congress also possesses a power over
when and in what manner justice is administered. Ironically, state courts
have often found it necessary to restrict legislative attempts to overburden
the judicial branch with extra administrative duties.34 If Congress at-
tempted to move in the other direction, the Court could probably fall back
on the separation of powers doctrine and declare the act an interference
with inherent judicial powers.
We come now to the most simple, and yet at the same time most
complicated, Congressional weapon for interference with judicial admin-
istration - limitation of federal jurisdiction. It would be incredibly simple
to affect the Court's future decisions by denying jurisdiction in all matters
which are in dispute. Indeed Congress tried to use this remedy with the
Clayton Act3 5 by denying the federal court's power of injunction in certain
labor disputes. When this attempt was very narrowly construed in Duplex
Printing Press Company v. Deering,36 Congress struck back with the
Norris-La Guardia Act.8 7 The battle finally ended when the Supreme
32. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
33. 236 Mo. 142, 139 S.W. 403 (1911).
34. Richardson v. County Court of Kanawha County, 78 S.E.2d 569 (W.Va. 1953).
35. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 44 (1958).
36. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
37. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
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Court upheld the Norris-La Guardia Act in Lauf v. E. G. Skinner Com-
pany.38 Whether this exchange settled the question of Congressional
power in the jurisdictional area is extremely doubtful.
Only once in our history has the Congress bluntly used the jurisdic-
tional weapon to weaken the Court's power. This event took place in 1867,
when the previously mentioned struggle over Reconstruction was taking
place. At that time, confronted with the full power of Congress, the Court
bowed in Ex parte McCardle39 and agreed to have its appellate juris-
diction stripped away by an act of Congress. Notwithstanding the McCardle
case and its earlier decision in Turner v. Bank of North America,40 many
commentators doubt that today's Court would tolerate an outright attack
on its appellate or its lower court's original jurisdiction in important
constitutional areas.41
It is well to keep in mind that in the jurisdictional area Congress is
barred by the Constitution from limiting only a minimum of judicial power,.
In the first instance the Constitution grants original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court in a few areas such as those in which a state is a party.42
Although relatively minor in scope, these areas are clearly outside the
reach of Congress. Secondly, because the Supreme Court is granted ap-
pellate jurisdiction generally, it is commonly recognized that Congress
would have to leave the lower federal courts jurisdiction in at least one
area, perhaps patent cases. However, even granting this action by Congress,
the state courts would always be available to an aggrieved party with a
possibility of review by the Supreme Court.43 Thus it seems the Court is
secure in its jurisdiction and any move to limit that jurisdiction might prove
not only fruitless, but also might be of questionable constitutional sound-
ness or political merit.
Perhaps a more interesting weapon Congress could use to strike at
the Supreme Court would be to require more than a simple majority to
declare an act unconstitutional. It has always struck proponents of the
Congressional point of view as somewhat inequitable that most acts by one
branch of government in overruling another branch take a two-thirds
vote,44 yet by a majority of only one judge the Court is able to strike down
legislation concurred in by both the legislative and executive branches or
enacted by a sovereign state. This seeming injustice was addressed by
Senator Borah who proposed that Congress enact legislation requiring at
least seven of the Court's nine members to concur before an act could be
declared unconstitutional .4
38. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
39. 6 Wall. 318 (U.S. 1867).
40. 4 Dall. 8 (U.S. 1799).
41. Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit The Jurisdiction Of Federal Courts:
An Exercise In Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. Rzv. 1362 (1953).
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
43. Hart, supra note 41.
44. E.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7.
45. S. Res. 4483, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923).
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Although the Senator apparently did not agree, such a solution would
seem to require a constitutional amendment in view of the separation of
powers doctrine. At least the experience of Ohio would seem to so indicate.
In 1912 Ohio adopted a constitutional amendment making it mandatory
that all but one of the Ohio Supreme Court Justices concur before a
statute could be declared unconstitutional. 46 Generally the amendment has
been unsuccessful in curbing the state court's power. In fact, in Board of
Education v. City of Columbus,47 the Ohio court candidly admitted that
justices were deliberately voting against constitutionality despite their
feelings in an individual case in order to avoid the state constitution. 41
Thus once a majority of the court believes a statute is unconstitutional,
enough of the minority will vote with the majority to achieve their purpose.
However the Ohio amendment has not been totally without effect. In the
recent case of Hudson Distributors Inc. v. Upjohn Co.,49 which involved
the constitutionality of a state fair trade law, the voting amendment had a
decisive influence. Thus even though a majority of the court felt that the
statute was unconstitutional, the law was upheld because the requisite
number of votes could not be obtained when three justices stood firm for
constitutionality.
The Ohio experience would seem to indicate that any such attempt by
Congress would be ill advised. Not only is it probable that a constitutional
amendment would be necessary to effectuate such a change, but the remedy
as an attempt at political control appears to be of doubtful value in view of
the stand the Ohio Supreme Court has taken towards the attempt.
AMENDMENT
With the cooperation of the state legislatures, Congress undoubtedly
could overrule any Supreme Court decision by passing an amendment to
the constitution. At present a whole series of possible amendments are
circulating among the states, including one which would remove the issue
of legislative apportionment from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.50
Two previously successful efforts have been made by Congress to initiate
amendments overruling Court decisions.
The first occasion came after the Court's holding in Chisholm v.
Georgia" which allowed a state government to be sued by the assignees of
British creditors. To remedy what was thought to be a serious situation,
the llth amendment was adopted in 1798.32 It is probably the least im-
portant of all constitutional amendments, because the federal courts have
virtually ignored it.
46. OHIO CONSr. OP 1912 art. IV, § 2.
47. 118 Ohio St. 295, 160 N.E. 902 (1928).
48. The federal constitutionality of the unequal application of the amendment by the
Ohio Supreme Court was upheld in State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metrop. Park Dist.,
281 U.S. 74 (1930).
49. 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N.E.2d 460 (1963), aff'd, 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
50. Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack, 25 U. PITT. L. Rtv. 1 (1963).
51. 2 Dall. 419 (U.S. 1793).
52. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. XI.
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The second use of the amendment power was far more important. It
was the famous Income Tax amendment 3 used to overrule the Pollack v.
The Farmer's Loan and Trust Company54 case which had outlawed federal
taxes on personal income. This amendment passed the Senate by a vote
of 77 to 0 and then swept through the state legislatures in a massive revolt
against the Pollack case. 55
There are, however, a number of serious drawbacks to any resort to
amendment as a weapon against the Court. In the first place, the process
is exceedingly cumbersome. The 11th amendment, for example, took five
years before it became law. In today's world such a wait might well prove
intolerable both to the government and the general public.
There is also a further problem of court interference with the amending
process. On the federal level the situation in this respect is extremely
cloudy. Coleman v. Miller,5" with a badly split court (3-2-4), is the latest
case on the subject. It greatly reduced the number of issues which the
Supreme Court could consider with regard to the ratification of an amend-
ment. The Chief Justice and Justices Reed and Stone felt that although
there was standing to test the ratification of an amendment by a state, on
the part of members of the state's legislature, the question of whether the
proposed amendment had become stale was completely within the dis-
cretion of Congress. Although they concurred in the result, Justices Black,
Douglas, Roberts and Frankfurter felt that there was no standing to sue
regardless of the issues in such a case. Justices Butler and McReynolds
dissented on the ground that the Court should consider the issue of when
an amendment becomes stale and further that the amendment in question
was stale. The vital question of whether the Court could pass on the
qualifications of members of the state legislatures to vote on the amendment
was left undecided because the Court was split evenly on whether the
issue was political in nature.5 7
In the state courts the issue has been much more clearly decided in
favor of judicial supervision of the amending process. McConoughy v.
Secretary of State 8 held that the procedure by which an amendment was
adopted could be inquired into by the courts in detail. Today one can only
speculate whether legislatures, apportioned in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause could successfully ratify an amendment proposed by a Con-
gress similarly based. However, it would seem that regardless of the
Coleman case the present Supreme Court would look rather closely into
the matter.59
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
54. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
55. Kelly and Harbison, supra note 16, at 613.
56. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
57. See also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
58. 106 Minn. 392, 119 N.W. 408 (1909).
59. Clark, The Supreme Court And The Amending Process, 39 VA. L. RPv.
621 (1953).
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